In its Opinion 1/94
12 on the competence of the EU to join the WTO, the Court did not address the questions related to the dispute settlement mechanism. Despite the fact that the WTO Agreement is a mixed agreement, practice reveals that the EU has taken the lead, even in procedures against the Member States. This implies that the European Commission represents both the Union and the Member States in all WTO litigation. 13 While theoretical complexities related to the division of competences were bound to occur, Hoffmeister argued that:
It has never happened in the history of WTO that the EU would try to argue itself out of a responsibility under WTO agreements by pointing a finger to a Member State and argue that that Member State is responsible. On the contrary, when protesting against the inclusion of the Member States in the dispute, the EU maintained the view that it is the correct respondent. In some instances, the EU even took full responsibility for a measure that was adopted by a Member State without being firmly based in EU law.
14 To date the Union (including its predecessors) has been involved in a large number of WTO disputes: 97 times as a complainant, 82 times as a respondent and 158 times as a third party.
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Another example is provided by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
As a party to UNCLOS, the EU is subject to the dispute settlement mechanism laid down therein and it may become a plaintiff or defendant before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) or in arbitration initiated under UNCLOS. 16 The mechanism established by the Furthermore, it also applied to the ITLOS for provisional measures to prevent the UK from commissioning the plant. The ITLOS ordered the parties to cooperate and to engage in consultations, including the exchange of information, without further delay. While the EU itself was not a party to the dispute, EU law played a role (see below).
19
Nevertheless, an appearance by the EU in UNCLOS dispute settlement remains rare.
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One example is the so-called 'swordfish dispute' covering both access for EU fishing vessels to Chilean ports and bilateral and multilateral scientific and technical cooperation on conservation of swordfish stocks. 21 The dispute was meant to be dealt with both by a WTO Panel and by the ITLOS, but in the end was solved on the basis of an amicable settlement between the two parties in 2001. 22 In 2000, on the basis of Article 287(3) UNCLOS, Chile started proceedings against the (at that time) European Community by instituting an arbitral tribunal. During the process the parties agreed to ask the ITLOS, instead of the arbitral tribunal, to set up a special chamber to deal with the case. The Community-inter alia-claimed that
Chile had violated the right to fish on the high seas. In return, Chile argued-inter alia-that the commencement of the WTO dispute settlement proceedings was a breach of UNCLOS.
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This allows for the EU to act as a sort of amicus curiae to the ICJ on certain interpretative questions arising in litigation between others. cf also Art 34(2) of the Statute and Art 69 of the Rules of the Court on the possibility of supplying information in pending cases. See also Hoffmeister (n 3).
The case is interesting as it reveals that the question on the appropriate forum for dispute settlement may involve more than two international regimes. As indicated by Stoll and Vdneky:
Two obstacles could be brought in the way of the legal power of ITLOS: the first is that the case was already pending at the WTO, when it was brought before the tribunal; the second is that the core question of the case, the lawfulness of the prohibition on unloading swordfish, is covered by GATT rights and obligations.
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In this case no questions of EU law came up. Yet, for the purpose of the present discussion it is important to note that in general Article 287(7) UNCLOS would imply that there is no reason to halt cases brought before the ITLOS once they are also brought before another tribunal. In addition, and in relation to other agreements in general, Article 311(2) UNCLOS provides: behalf was applicable. In that case the EU had been invited to present its views as a party to the Convention, whereas in the view of the Court, Article 218(9) addresses a situation which concerns the positions to be adopted on behalf of the European Union in the context of its participation, through its institutions or, as the case may be, through its Member States acting jointly in its interests, in the adoption of such acts within the international body concerned.
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As, furthermore, the purpose of the statement was not to formulate a policy in relation to fishing-see the second sentence of Article 16(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 34 -but to present to ITLOS an analysis of the provisions of international and EU law relevant to that subject, the Commission did not encroach upon the prerogatives of the Council. that deals with the allocation of financial responsibility between the EU and its Member States.
While there may be doubts as to whether the Regulation will not be able to affect the Union's famous autonomy, 48 it has also been argued that it is questionable whether the Regulation is in conformity with international law, given-again-the specific nature and demands of the EU.
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For the present chapter it suffices to note that the EU can have a separate standing in ISDS. 55 See n 1 above. Parts of this section are based on Łazowski and Wessel, 'When Caveats turn into Locks' (n 1).
Credits are due to Adam Łazowski; yet the usual disclaimer applies.
Lisbon, reiterates that accession to ECHR should 'preserve the specific features of Union law' and the need for reinforced dialogue between the CJEU in Luxembourg and the ECtHR in Strasbourg.
As the CJEU argues in Opinion 2/13, submission of the EU to judicial control on the basis of an international agreement, is subject to a conditio sine qua non: such an international agreement, which provides for existence of another court, will be acceptable and may affect the Court's powers 'only if the indispensable conditions for safeguarding the essential character of those powers are satisfied and, consequentially, there is no adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU legal order'. 56 In this particular case, the judges clarify that ECHR bodies, particularly the ECtHR, may not bind the EU, including its institutions, 'to a particular interpretation of the rules of EU law'. 57 As things stand, it would be the interpretation of ECHR by the ECtHR that would bind the CJEU but, as the judges explicitly admit, it will not be the other way round. To put it differently, accession to the ECHR will only be possible if it is guaranteed that the CJEU will have the exclusive competence to determine whether EU law, particularly the Charter of Fundamental Rights, applies or whether a particular case falls within the remit of the ECHR.
Behind all this lies Article 344 TFEU, which provides that 'Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein'. This provision has continuously been used by the CJEU to claim its exclusive jurisdiction whenever the interpretation or application of EU law is at stake. 58 As already explained, Article 6(2) TEU makes it clear that the accession will not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties. Furthermore, Article 3 of Protocol 8 confirms that nothing in the Agreement will affect Article 344 TFEU. In addition, the model of CJEU judges participating in the EEA Court sounded like a good idea at first, but the CJEU held that because of the two instruments' divergent objectives, the CJEU justices would have to apply and interpret 'the same provisions but using different approaches, methods and concepts'. 71 This would affect their independence as a CJEU judge.
The bottom line in Opinion 1/91 was that interpretative jurisdiction had to remain exclusively with the CJEU.
The arguments were not all new and could already partly be found in Opinion 1/76 on a European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterways. 72 The Convention which was to set up that 68 Opinion 1/00 (n 59). 
C. The European Union's Contribution to the Development of IDS
A different, but related, question is to what extent the difficulties of the EU in participating in IDS affect its influence on international law-making in that area. 74 After all, since the Treaty of Lisbon in particular, the EU Treaties clearly reveal the EU's global ambitions in this area, which basically boil down to the idea that the EU should-at least partly-shift its focus from its own Member States to third countries, 75 thereby even limiting the possibilities for its own Member States to contribute on their own to international law-making. 76 Obviously, the principle of autonomy could lead to further fragmentation and a disconnection between EU law and international law. 77 Hence, we are used to extensive referencing by the EU Court to international law. As some observers found:
A survey of the ever-burgeoning CJEU jurisprudence reveals that the EU courts, when faced with questions of international law, show a high degree of deference to the case-law of the ICJ and use it as an authoritative interpretation of international norms that are of relevance to their work. This is especially the case when they are faced with questions of customary international law-chiefly relating to international law of the sea and to international treaty law.
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And, 'recent practice shows that the EU Courts are making knowledgeable references to the case-law of the ICJ in order to settle a wider gamut of international law questions'.
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Yet, it remains unclear to which extent these references by the CJEU have contributed to international law-making. The CJEU is believed to have had some influence through its interpretation of international treaty law. As Odermatt argued in relation to international treaty law:
By applying the VCLT, the CJEU can be seen as contributing to the 'strict observance and the development of international law'. Like any domestic Court, however, the CJEU may employ international treaty law in a way that deviates from established practice in international law … This means the CJEU will sometimes contribute to international law by deciding upon the customary international law status of the VCLT rules.
Odermatt's study also points to the fact that the CJEU often interprets treaty law in a somewhat 'selfish' way and its application is influenced by its approach to the interpretation of EU law.
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This may even lead to a misuse of international law and to further fragmentation.
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Yet, it may be also argued that by relying on ICJ interpretations of international law and by confirming the status of the rules, the EU in fact contributes to the coherence of the international legal system. The problem, however, is that, as Nevill has pointed out:
There are no references to the decisions of the EU courts in judgments of the ICJ, the Inter- As we have seen, in many cases, the EU, as reflected in the CJEU's case law, presents itself as a closed entity, zealous to maintain its autonomy. Perhaps the 'otherness' or 'specialness' of the EU in itself as well as its effect on the 'statehood' of EU Member States may be the most visible contribution to, at least, the practice of international dispute settlement.
III. Principles Underlying the EU's (Non-)participation in IDS
The previous sections shed light on actual and attempted EU (and MS) participation in IDS.
The preliminary conclusion was that such participation remains limited at least if one considers IDS of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. 91 The question can thus be asked as to possible reasons behind this phenomenon; and in particular whether EU law is part of the explanation.
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As hinted earlier, various rules governing the EU participation in IDS have been spelled out in the case law of the CJEU rather than being clearly specified in primary law (section III.C). This does not mean that treaty provisions have little to say on the matter. This section thus briefly underlines the relevance of EU external objectives and competence, in that they establish the normative (section III.A) and constitutional framework (section III.B) within which the Court is to adjudicate on the issue of EU participation. This discussion indeed reveals a discrepancy between this framework on the one hand, and some of the judge-made conditions for EU participation in IDS, on the other.
A. The Normative Element: EU Participation and Objectives of EU External Action
A cursory look at the objectives of the EU in the field of external action suggests that far from dissuading EU participation in IDS, those objectives seem on the contrary to encourage it. Thus, EU involvement in IDS may be viewed as a means to achieve 'the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations
Charter', mentioned in Article 3(5) TEU.
It also corresponds to the general ambition, set out in Article 21 (1) The intention is to 'promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations'. It may equally help fulfilling the Union's objective, enshrined in Article 21(2)(a) and (h) TEU, to 'consolidate and support … the rule of law … and the principles of international law [and] promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance'.
In short, EU participation in IDS neatly fits with the teleological framework within which the EU ought to act externally. Further, such participation can be viewed as an effective means for the EU to be an active player on the international scene in line with its own objectives, not only in terms of its role as rule-promoter but also as rule-complier and rule-enforcer.
B. The Constitutional Element: EU Competence to Participate in (Specific) IDS
The EU capacity to take part in and be bound by IDS derives from its legal personality confirmed by Article 47 TEU. The latter replicates the original phrasing of Article 210 EEC, which the Court of Justice had interpreted broadly. 93 In the above-mentioned judgment concerning the EU's participation in proceedings of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the CJEU also recalled the significance of the legal capacity that the EU enjoys under Article 335 TFEU, according to which:
In each of the Member States, the Union shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under their laws; it may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and may be a party to legal proceedings. To this end, the Union shall be represented by the Commission. However, the Union shall be represented by each of the institutions, by virtue of their administrative autonomy, in matters relating to their respective operation.
The Court thus found that:
[I]t is clear from the case law of the Court that Article 335 TFEU, although restricted to Member States on its wording, is the expression of a general principle that the European Union has legal capacity and is to be represented, to that end, by the Commission (see, to that effect, judgment in Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C-131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 94).
It follows that Article 335 TFEU provided a basis for the Commission to represent the European Union before ITLOS in Case No 21.
In Opinion 1/91, the Court found that the (then)
Community's competence in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entails the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such an agreement as regards the interpretation and application of its provisions.
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As we have seen, it also considered that submission of the EU to external jurisdiction is not per se in conflict with the characteristics of the EU's legal order:
[W]here … an international agreement provides for its own system of courts, including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the Contracting parties to the agreement, and, as a result, to interpret its provisions, the decisions of that Court will be binding on the Community institutions, including the Court of Justice. Those decisions will also be binding in the event that the Court of Justice is called upon to rule, by way of preliminary ruling or in a direct action, on the interpretation of the international agreement, insofar as that agreement is an integral part of the Community legal order. An international agreement providing for such a system of courts is in principle compatible with Community law.
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That the full legal capacity has been vested on the EU as a whole has been subsequently 'The Community is … not only entitled to enter into contractual relations with a third country in this connexion but also has the power, while observing the provisions of the Treaty, to cooperate with that country in setting up an appropriate organism such as the public international institution which it is proposed to establish under the name of the "European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels". The Community may also, in this connexion, cooperate with a third country for the purpose of giving the organs of such an institution appropriate powers of decision and for the purpose of defining, in a manner appropriate to the objectives pursued, the nature, elaboration, implementation and effects of the provisions to be adopted within such a framework' (para 5).
96 Opinion 1/09 (n 67) para 74.
decisions of a court which is created or designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and application of their provisions.
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As the italicised phrase indicates, EU Treaties may indeed contain a specific mandate for the Union to take part in IDS. In establishing that the EU shall accede to the ECHR, Article 6(2) TEU implies that the EU is empowered (if not bound) to become part of the judicial system set up by the ECHR, albeit under the conditions contained in particular in Protocol 8, as further discussed below.
Arguably, the inclusion of foreign direct investment in the Common Commercial Policy, as per Article 207 TFEU (see above), also points towards the implicit acceptance, if not intention, of the treaty drafters that the EU will get involved in related IDS. In particular, empowering the EU to conclude investment treaties (alone or with Member States), suggests the acknowledgement that it could participate in the dispute settlement mechanism that often features in such treaties.
In sum: EU primary law contains several elements that point towards an interest in the EU's participation in IDS. This is not only inherent in its international legal personality, it also derives from various treaty provisions which articulate this specific aspect of the EU international legal personality. 98 Having established its connection between EU participation in IDS and the EU global objectives, as well as having recalled the EU constitutional mandate for such a participation, the next section turns to the additional conditions governing this participation, which the CJEU has set out.
97 Opinion 2/13 (n 1) para 182. Emphasis added. 
C. General Conditions Governing the EU (and Member State) Participation in IDS
As one of its expressions, participation in IDS by the EU (and Member States) is governed by the basic principles that organise the EU's external action .
Hence, the EU may only take part in IDS if it has the (substantive) competence to conclude the international agreement that sets it up, and if the international agreement concerned allows organisations such as the EU to take part.
EU participation also depends on the scope of the agreement establishing the IDS. If the agreement and ensuing remit of the IDS relate to an area that falls outside areas of exclusive competence, the agreement will be mixed, and the right to participate in the IDS might have to be allocated between Member States and the EU, or joined, depending on the subject matter.
In this mixed framework, joint participation of Member States and the EU will equally be governed by general obligations deriving from EU external relations law, and particularly the duty of compliance and cooperation. The Court has thus articulated various obligations of conduct stemming from the duty of cooperation which bind Member States vis-à-vis EU institutions, including duties to inform and consult.
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In addition to these principles, the basic rules governing the functioning of the EU institutional framework also have significance for the EU's participation in IDS proceedings.
The principles of inter-institutional conferral, balance and cooperation, enshrined in Article 13(2) TEU, 100 are of particular relevance.
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That said, the EU (and Member State) participation in IDS also involves specific conditions. Partly enshrined in EU primary law, such conditions have been articulated by the 99 See eg MOX Plant (n 19).
CJEU, and partly codified since-viz in relation to the accession to the ECHR. These additional rules constrain both the EU participation in IDS, and that of Member States.
Hence, the CJEU considers that the participation of the EU is conceivable provided the autonomy of the EU legal order is preserved, a condition that, in effect, has led the Court to reject several international agreements on the ground that the IDS they established would be incompatible with the EU Treaties.
One particular aspect of this autonomy is that the IDS cannot interpret or apply EU law.
In acknowledging that the EU had the capacity to conclude agreements, it emphasised that the IDS is acceptable only if its jurisdiction is limited to the interpretation and application of the agreement that establishes it:
[T]he competence of the European Union in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entail the power to submit itself to the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and application of their provisions.
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In particular, the international treaty and its IDS should not alter the distribution of power within the EU, notably between the EU and the Member States. In MOX Plant, the Court underlined that 'an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the As alluded to earlier, the TEU now refers to specific conditions regarding the EU accession to the ECHR. Protocol 8 foresees that the Accession Agreement is to make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the EU and EU law and ensure that accession does not affect the competences of the EU or the powers of its institutions, or the situation of Member
States in relation to the ECHR, or indeed Article 344 TFEU. Aside from the reference to 'specific characteristics of the EU and EU law', the Protocol thus essentially reiterates the conditions that had been developed in the case law, and recalled above. This suggests that even without this Protocol, the Court could have reached the same conclusion in Opinion 2/13. To be sure, the Court's strict application of that Protocol confirms that participation in IDS is subject to very strict conditions, based on a broad concern for the autonomy of the EU legal order, and the preservation of its numerous specific characteristics, particularly the Court's position therein.
IV. Conclusions
Normatively and constitutionally, the EU participation in IDS appears to be encouraged by EU Treaties, albeit under certain broad conditions, including the classic rules governing the external action of the EU. Partly based on the EU primary law, such conditions have been developed by the CJEU, around the cardinal principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, which have arguably inspired the prerequisites included in primary law, conditioning the specific process of EU accession to the ECHR. The way in which the conditions have been articulated and interpreted lately by the CJEU appears to leave little room for actual participation.
That said, the mapping exercise undertaken here of successful and unsuccessful attempts by the EU to participate in IDS did not reveal definitive criteria for such participation. This ambiguity is borne out by a comparison between Opinion 2/13 (ECHR) to Opinion 1/94 (WTO).
As held by Cottier,
[the] WTO dispute settlement and its transmutation into a judicial system is a fascinating example how international law has begun to change and affect internal structures of the European Union. First, the expansion of the scope of WTO law cuts through traditional modes of allocating powers between the Union and the Member States … Second, the juridification of WTO dispute settlement means rethinking the role of the courts and their relationship to WTO rules.
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While these elements did not prevent the Court of Justice from approving the Union's accession to the WTO, similar arguments were at the heart of its disapproval in Opinion 2/13. This brings us to the key question raised in this chapter: given that the EU participation in IDS appears to be encouraged by EU Treaties, what are the conditions under which this participation would be in conformity with the principles underlying the EU legal order?
On the basis of primary law as well as case law flagged up here, we come to the following list:
1. IDS does not entail an adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU legal order.
2. IDS does not affect the allocation of powers between the EU and its Member States.
3. IDS cannot interpret EU law. 4. IDS does not limit the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the application and interpretation of EU law.
5. CJEU judges cannot sit on IDS tribunals.
These criteria in turn lead to a new set of questions, including:
1. How can possible issues relating to the autonomy of the EU legal order be adequately solved given the restrictive approach taken by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13? 2. As an EU international agreement becomes EU law, thus falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU, how can consistency be ensured between the interpretation given by IDS of the agreement to which it belongs, and that provided by the CJEU of the same instrument as part of EU law? And, how should possible differences be addressed?
3. How can the rule of Article 344 TFEU be reconciled with, for example, the treaty-based obligation for the EU to accede to the ECHR? 4. Is there a possible tension between the principles invoked by the CJEU to support its restrictive approach to EU participation in IDS (for example autonomy of the EU legal order) and other principles underpinning the EU external action? Does the Court's case law adequately reflect the treaty-based ambitions and powers vested in the EU?
The conclusion may very well be that EU participation in IDS would only be acceptable if the dispute to be settled concerns an interpretation of the international instrument and not interpretation of EU law, thus leaving the exclusive power to set the terms of internal application to the CJEU. Yet, given the EU's treaty-based mandate to participate in IDS and the questionable compatibility between the Court's stance and the principles enshrined in Article 13(2) TEU to which it is subject as an EU institution, it may be wondered whether the issue of EU participation should ultimately be left to the EU judiciary, particularly in view of the institutional interests that might colour its position.
